What has actually gone wrong with AI agents

The briefing reads a few hundred security sources a week. Anything scored as an incident gets grouped by shared names, rare terms and publication date, and then a person reads the result: merging what the grouping missed, splitting what it wrongly joined, and writing the summary. Nothing publishes without that review.

An entry has to be a specific, dated event involving named software, a named organization, or a named actor. That means disclosed vulnerabilities in shipping software, confirmed compromises, and agents taking real unauthorized action. It leaves out attack-technique papers and benchmarks, survey scans, forecasts, and opinion pieces, however good they are. Where the stored reporting did not make clear what actually happened, the item was dropped rather than guessed at.

Corrections matter more than completeness. Where a first report was later contradicted, both are kept in the same record so you can see the attribution change. Inclusion is editorial and never paid. If something here is wrong, say so at [email protected] and it gets fixed.