THE PERMISSION [LAYER]

AI agent incident

A poisoned web page rewrote AWS Kiro's config and ran code

Reported · 1 source

What happened

Intezer and Kodem researchers showed that hidden text on a web page could make AWS Kiro rewrite its own configuration and execute attacker-supplied code, with no approval step in the way.

Why it matters

The config write needed no approval at all, so text the agent read could change what the agent was allowed to do. Any setting an agent can edit is part of its attack surface; put approval gates on the agent's own configuration, outside the reach of the content it reads.

Sources

  1. The Hacker News AWS Kiro Flaw Let a Poisoned Web Page Rewrite Its Config and Run Code

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Background reading

Prompt injection The glossary definition, in plain English.

Cite or correct this record

“A poisoned web page rewrote AWS Kiro's config and ran code.” The Permission Layer AI Agent Incident Database, https://thepermissionlayer.com/incidents/aws-kiro-config-rewrite/. Database updated October 22, 2026.

Every record traces to the dated sources above. If something here is wrong or missing, email [email protected] and it gets fixed. See this record in the full list.

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